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Andrea Abdul

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Apa Fungsi Militer Indonesia dalam Strategi Anti-Teror?

ENG | 02 August 2012 | 08:05 Dibaca: 826   Komentar: 0   0

Tulisan Ini saya sajikan dalam tulisan aslinya yakni dalam bahasa Inggris

What is The Role of Indonesian “Military” on the Indonesian Counter-Terrorism Strategy

Despite multiple resolutions and international conventions, the UN has, for the moment, resigned itself the fact that it is impossible to reach agreement on a common definition (of terrorism) –Th. J Badley (1998).

I. Introduction

There are many constrains to develop a single agreed definition of terrorism. One key reason is that the use and meaning of the term “terrorism” has altered over time to accommodate the political requirements and discourse of each successive area. Regardless this barrier, UN Security Council has issued Resolution 1566 in October 2004. The Ad-Hoc Committee on Terrorism has also drafted a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. It is very important to make a clear definition of terrorism in order to develop a legal tool and organization in combating terrorism. The government of Indonesia defined terrorism as acts of someone who deliberately uses violence or threats of violence, causing sense of terror or fear of people or resulting in massive victims, in ways that plundering people’s freedom, lives, and materials, or causing destruction or damage towards strategic vital objects or environment or public facilities or international facilities.

Indonesian military forces (TNI) played a significant role to eliminate terrorism actions since the independent of Indonesia in 1945. According to LawNo.34/2004 about TNI article 7, the main task of TNI in the military operation beside war is counter terrorism. In this regard, TNI defined terrorism as any organized violence action which results mass human deaths and destruction (of building and infrastructure) as a tool for political reason.

According to Indonesian history, there was a period where TNI and Polri were under the same body, The Armed Force of Republic of Indonesia (ABRI). In this period, all counter terrorism actions were held by TNI. Since the reformation/transition period occurred, TNI and Polri were separated into two organizations where the chiefs of these organizations are directly reporting to President. This separation between TNI and Polri brought a very significant change in Indonesian counter terrorism organizations. After separation, the transition government assembled a new organization under Polri named Densus88. This is a special counter terrorism unit with their initial purpose against the ‘domestic’ terrorism.

Since Densus88 established, they have marked  significant achievements in combating terrorism. Many terrorist top leaders arrested and killed during their operation. This is contradictive compared to the counter terrorist bodies under TNI organization. They have never been involved anymore in combating terrorism therefore there is no achievement marked since Densus88 exist.

This essay will describe the counter terrorist organization under TNI before TNI-Polri separation and also the new counter terrorism body under Polri (Densus88) after separation. A simple analysis will be developed to define several weak points that needed in order to combat terrorism. Afterwards, a recommendation will be formulated by considering the trend of terrorist strategy in the near future.

II. The Role Of Military in Combating Terrorism

2.1. Before the Separation of TNI-Polri

After Indonesia declared its independence in 1945, Indonesian Military known as Republic of Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) has developed into a big and strong Military power within Southeast Asia Region. Since 1982, the military roles are expanded not only dealing with defense but also dealing with social affairs, known as TNI’s dual-functions. In term of defense, Indonesian Armed Forces has engaged in several conflicts and wars against separatists and rebel movements who wanted to overthrown the sovereignty of Indonesia.

Further, The Role of Military in Indonesia since 1945 until the separation of TNI-Polri in the year of 1999 can be divide into two periods, Soekarno’s period (1945-1966) and Soeharto’s ( 1966-1998 ). During this time, the counter terrorism strategy was dinamically changing following the characteristic of the terrorism organizations in each specific period.

2.1.1    Policy

The origin of terror during Soekarno’s administration can be classified into 3 kinds as follow:

1. Separatism movement based on their close relations with ex-imperialist (e.g RMS movement led by Dr Soumokil, J.H Manuhutu and Johan Manusama who was a Dutch stooge)

2. Terrorism movement based on ideology (e.g Indonesian Communist party/PKI’s revolt in 1948 and 1965 and also DI/TII’s in West Java, South Sulawesi and Aceh)

3. Rebel Movement based on ethnicity which was generated by inequal policy between Java and other islands. (e.g PRRI/Permesta’s rebellion in Sulawesi and Sumatra)

Soekarno used negotiation and social approach as his policy in order to combat several threats mentioned above. At that time, the government preferred to select military rather than police. It is because the separatism movements endangered the sovereignty of Indonesia and most of rebels were ex-militant or military desertions. On the other hand, Soekarno put Mobile Brigade (Brimob)  Polri as  back up in combating terrorism.

During Soeharto period, the origin of terrorism movements can be divided into two as follow:

1. Separatism movement (e.g Aceh Freedom Movement /GAM since 1975, Papua Freedom Movement/OPM since early 1970’s and Fretilin in East Timor since 1975)

2. Religion extremist movement (e.g Warsidi Recitation group in Lampung known as Talang Sari incident, Islamic radical group which hijacked Garuda airplane in Don muang).

Soeharto’s policy was still using the military power but dominated by the Army with its Special Forces (Kopassus/Den 81). The Army was supported by Indonesia Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order  (Kopkamtib) which was established in late 1965. This Supporter Agency iwas in charge to control and manage all security actors, whether police, military, intelligence and include territories network to keep on eye every social and political activities during Soeharto’s administration. The Territorial Command was very effective to counter any activities which threaten the country.

Soeharto used left and right extreme as a label of separatist and terrorist movement. The right extreme represented radical and fundamental Islamic movements and left extreme represented to communist movement. Massive military power was deployed  to overcome the separatist movements in Indonesian crisis area such as Aceh, Papua and East Timor.

2.1.2    Organization Structure.

According to UU no 20/1982, the Organization of The Indonesian Armed Forces consist of Army, Air force, Navy and Indonesian Police. During Soekarno’s administration, Indonesian Armed Forces did not have special counter terrorism units.

After Don Muang incident (Garuda Hijacking) in March 1981, the idea to establish an anti-terror unit has emerged, thus Army Special Forces established 81st Detachment (Den 81 Kopassus). The Indonesian Army Special Forces has one group of 81st Detachment and under command and control directly by the Commander General of  Indonesia Army Special Forces.

The Navy (Marines) also established Jalamangkara Detachment (Denjaka Marinir) in 1984 which its personnel are recruited from Frog Troops Command (Kopaska) and Marines Amphibious Reconnaissance Unit (Taifib Marinir). The Jalamangkara Detachment consist of one Detachment HQ, one Technical Unit and three Combat Units.

The latest established unit is Air Force Bravo Detachment (Den Bravo Paskhas) in 1990 which part of Indonesian Air force Special Forces (Paskhas). During Soeharto’s period, these anti-terror units were supported by Indonesian Intelligence Coordinating Agency (Bakin) and Security and Order Operation Command (Kopkamtib)

2.1.3    Main Task

The main tasks of The Indonesian Armed Forces is to guaranty a security with its efforts and actions in order to uphold Indonesian sovereignty and defense Indonesian territory. The Army is dealing with land and its territory, navy is dealing with sea and air forces responsible in Indonesian Air, and The Indonesian Police responsible in keeping security and discipline among society.

In term of anti-terror  units, 81st Detachment of Indonesian Armed Special Forces is responsible for combating terrorist action in selective strategic targets such as rescuing hostages on buses, trains, airplanes, buildings, and jungles. The Jalamangkara Detachment is responsible to maintain and conduct anti terror and anti sabotage ability at sea/water and on coastal areas and also conduct a sea intelligence aspect. Bravo Detachment is responsible for combating terrorist attack on the airport and airplane hijacking and also provides an intelligence to support air operations.

2.1.4    Achievement

Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) has achieved a significant success in combating separatism and terrorism which were threatened Indonesian Sovereignty. During Soekarno’s administration (1945-1966), several rebellions such as DI/TII, PKI, and APRA were being eradicated by Indonesian Armed Forces.

The Indonesian Anti-terror unit also has successfully eliminated terrorist attempt and the most biggest scale of anti-terror operation that ever perpetrated by 81st Detachment is the rescue  of  Garuda Hijacking victims in Don Muang Airport, Thailand.

2.2.      After The Separation of TNI and Polri

2.2.1    Policy

The fall of the New Order regime in 1998 gives a huge impact on TNI and Polri’s role in Indonesian politic and societal dimensions. The TNI’s authority, as reflected in TNI’s dual function and the unification between TNI and Polri, regarded as the determining factors of the fall of New Order Regime. Hence in 18th August 2000, Indonesian People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR-RI) released a Decree No.VI/MPR/2000 on the separation between Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) and Police of the Republic of Indonesia (Polri) and a Decree No. VI/MPR/2000 on the role of TNI and Polri. In order to manage their specific function and task, Indonesian government also released Law No.34/2004 on Indonesian Armed Forces and Law No.2/2002 on the Indonesian Police as supporting regulations.

In the context of terrorism, Bali bombing on the 12th October 2002 becomes the determining factor for further regulation. This event has created an atmosphere of terror and fear to Indonesian people. President Megawati Sukarnoputri at that time responded with the establishment of Government Regulation. No.1/2002, Government Regulation No.2/2002, and Law No.15/2003 in combating terrorism. Special Detachment 88 (Densus 88) was formed along with the Chief of Police Regulation No.30/VI/2003, as the implementation of  Law No.15/2003 in combating terrorism.

2.2.2    Organization

Densus 88 is placed under the Criminal and Investigation Body (Bareskrim) of  Police Headquarters and led by the Chief of Special Detachment 88 (min. Brigadier-General of Police). At the level of regional police, Special Detachment 88 AT is organized under the Directorate of Detective (Ditserse) led by middle-police officer. For Police Type A, Special Detachment 88 middle-ranking officers led by the Great Commissioner of Police, while in Type B Police led by Large Adjunct Commissioner of Police.

At the Police Headquarters, the structure of Special Detachment 88 has four sub-detachments (Subden) in order to support its operational level. The Subdens divided into Subden Intelligence, Subden Repression, Subden Investigation, and Support Subden. Below the  Subden there are units that became the foundation for operational support Special Detachment 88, Those are  Subden Intelligence Analysis Unit, Detection Unit, Counter-Intelligence Unit, under the  Repression Subden are negotiation unit, pre-eliminary unit, Penetration Unit, and Explosive Unit. Subden Investigation consists of crime scene oversee unit, examination unit, and Technical Assistance Unit, the latest in there  Subden Suport with units, Operational Support Unit and the Administrative Support Unit.

2.2.3    Main Tasks

The main task of Special Detachment 88 is to conduct investigations and criminal investigations and other tasks in the field of criminal acts of terrorism. To achieve these tasks, Special Detachment  88  has the functions as follow:

1. Intelligence, which includes detection, analysis and counter-intelligence.

2. Repression which include negotiation, preliminary, penetration, and the taming of explosives.

3. Investigation, which includes crime scene examination, the examination of witnesses and defendants, evidence and submission of the case within the framework of CJS.

4. Support, which include provision of support equipment, communications and transportation and other logistics including coordination, international and national cooperation and inter-departments.

2.2.4    Achievement

Two months after the detachment was formed, they had to deal with a car bomb explosion at Hotel JW Marriott, an American network hotel. This incident killed 13 people. Within weeks, the luxury hotel bomber network detected, and the actors were arrested.

On 9 September 2004, Jakarta was shocked again by a big powerful car bomb explosion in front of Australian Embassy. However, this bomb killed dozens of people who were not associated with these embassies. Special Detachment 88 along with Australian Federal Police (AFP) managed to disassemble the case, and arrested the perpetrators. Within three months, Special Detachment 88 can dismantle and arrest the perpetrators.

Bali Bombing II was pushing Special Detachment 88 close to the most wanted terrorist in Indonesia, Dr. Azahari. A month after the Bali Bombing II, Special Detachment 88 raided the residence of the fugitive Dr. Azahari, in Batu Malang, East Java. This raid led to the most wanted terrorist leader in Indonesia and Malaysia was dead, and the case was later determined that Special Detachment 88 as a leading force in Asia. At the same time Special Detachment 88 also succeeded to capture perpetrators of bombing in Palu Traditional Market.

Performers were one of the groups involved in the conflict in Poso.In 2006, AT 88 Densus Police almost caught one of the other terrorist kingpin; Noordin M. Top, in a raid conducted Special Detachment 88 in the village of Binangun, Wonosobo, Central Java. Noordin could escape from the pursuit of Special Detachment 88. In this operation, Special Detachment 88 caught two men and gun down two other suspects. A year later, on the 22nd of March 2007, Special Detachment 88 conducted raids against terrorism group of Central Java and managed to dismantle the largest network of weapons and bombs since last 30 years in the area of Sleman, Yogyakarta, and arrested seven suspects who allegedly owner, storage, and assembler explosives. In this ambush, 2 persons who attempted to escape were killed.

Following the uncover of  Terrorists Network in Central Java, Special Detachment 88 also managed to paralyze Abu Dujana a.k.a Ainul Bahri Wings Military Commander of Jama Islamiyah (JI), and Zarkasih, one of JI followers. In the raid conducted by Densus 88 on the 17th of September 2009 in Mojosongo, Surakarta, Central Java certainly one of the victims is the number one fugitive terrorist Noordin M. Top.

III. Evaluation on TNI’s Role in Combating Terrorism

After analyzing several aspects that have changed in TNI’s role in combating terrorism in Indonesia (after and before the reformation of TNI and Polri), we would like to emphasized several important points to be evaluated. These points will be divided into 4 parts: Decreasing of TNI’s role in combating terrorism, the lack of supporting policy for TNI, poor coordination between TNI and Polri, and the ineffectiveness of TNI organization structure.

3.1. Decreasing of TNI’s Role in Combating Terrorism

As explained in the previous part, the main authority in combating terrorism is given to Polri by the government. This decision has made based on 3 driver factors. First, it was government strategy in combating terrorism which one of those is to provide reliable professional anti-terrorism unit supported by sophisticated equipments and qualified human resources. In fact at that time, Indonesian armed forces armaments and military education are still embargoed, especially by United States. Second, terrorism in Indonesia is linked with criminality or threat to the law enforcement in Indonesia. Therefore, it is put into domestic context and law enforcement issues where it is under the authority of Indonesian Police. Third, avoiding the resistance of people and international community in which the sentiment conditions after the fall of Soeharto’s regime.

3.2. The Lack of Supporting Policy for TNI

As explained in the previous part, in order to combat terrorism, Indonesia has made some regulations to eliminate terrorism. Indonesian policy on counter-terrorism has been reflected in Government Regulation No. 1/2002 on Combating Acts of Terrorism and later being revised in Law No. 15/2003 on Combating Acts of Terrorism.

Based on the regulation, there are two executors in combating terrorism in Indonesia. First executor is police, based on Act No.2/2002 on the Law of Indonesian Police that stated police have obligation to secure the nation from any threats (domestic context). Second is Indonesian military force or TNI, based on Law No.34 /2004 Article 7 number 2 point b that stated some main tasks of TNI besides war, one of them is combating terrorism.

Theoretically, both of them have a different authority in combating terrorism. In some extent, police authority in dealing with low escalation threat is bigger than TNI. In other hand, if the escalation of threat is high, then TNI authority will be bigger than Police. There are 4 conditions which military can get involved in the operations:

1. Military force has been used as an extension of police force.

2. When terrorist groups are supported by countries or when they operate from specific geographic areas, military force has been used to strike terrorist based.

3. Military force has been the evolution of counter terrorist commando units. These has been primarily in hostage rescue operation, but they have also been employed as specialized strike units.

4. With the threat of destruction from WMD, specialized military responses have been developed for a technological attack.

However, the parameters of high or low escalation of threat have not been clearly defined in the regulation, therefore the main task of both TNI and Polri are become overlapped. As the reasons mention, the presence of Densus 88 (Police) is expected to be professional entity that able to perform its role according to Chief of Police Regulation No. Skep. 30/VI/2003 on combating terrorism in Indonesia, especially acts of terror by bombing mode. Therefore according to the regulations and Indonesia national strategy, Polri is the main authority who is responsible to encounter terrorism while TNI does not have legitimate power to be involved dealing with this issue although the conditions much likely changed.

However, there are still some parts of terrorism that police cannot handle as mentioned before. If there are high escalation of threat especially happens in the sea or air jurisdictional. Therefore, further policy is needed to elucidate TNI’s role, position and scope of task in dealing with terrorism issue in Indonesia.

3.3. Poor Coordination between TNI and Polri

Since Polri take the main responsibility in combating terrorism, it does not mean that Polri cannot make some coordination with other body that also responsible for the security of the nation, in this term is TNI. The lack of coordination could make fatal error in military operations and add some difficulties to achieve national security or interest. The poor coordination between TNI and Polri can be seen in the latest terrorist ambush in Nangroe Aceh Darussalam by Polri in March 2010. In that case, 2 personnel of Polri died. Polri also said that their personnel died because of the lack of capability and experience of guerilla war in wilderness condition.

Moreover, one personnel of Densus 88 cited that the failure to arrest a person who was involved in Jimbaran and Kuta bomb happened because of an excessive number of units in charge uncoordinated with each other. In this term of condition, Polri needs to make coordination with TNI in order to reduce human error and mis-coordination that might be happened.

3.4. Ineffectiveness of TNI Organization Structure

Along with TNI’s second position on combating terrorism, the power and the professionalism of TNI is not well-implemented. As supporting components to Polri, anti-terror organization in TNI only acts as informant to Polri. TNI can only acts if there is an instruction from the president in the specific case or requested by Polri. Otherwise, TNI can only be a stand-by power.

IV. Conclusion

The terrorism organization in Indonesia particularly the groups which are suspected to have a link to Al-Qaeda have made some significant change in terms of their target and operational method/tactics. The transformation of the pattern of terrorism in Indonesia can be defined by its target. This transformation can be divided into 3 segments; 2000-2001, 2001-2009, and from 2010.(See figure 3).

According to the factual and potential threat of terrorism that have mentioned in figure 3, Indonesia ideally required coordination between Polri-TNI operations or a new institution under the authority of the President, that have ability and obligation in coordinating TNI-Polri against terrorism. In order to prepare future threat of terrorism, government has released Presidential Regulation No.46/2010 on the establishment of National Committee in Combating Terrorism (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme).

The missing part of the previous regulations is the miss of coordination regulation detail between TNI and Polri in combating terrorism. This new regulation has stated and put its attention into the coordination details between both of them. Therefore, the Indonesian military strategy is already in the right track.

Although there is a clear definition of the coordination between TNI and Polri, Polri still have the main authorities. Therefore, TNI should become a supporting elements to Polri in combating terrorism under coordination from BNPT. Furthermore, the mix elements of Polri and TNI in BNPT’s Task Force should be proportional in TC unit and synergize their task together in order to achieve their capability.

However, the capability improvement of TNI’s CT units must being conducted by join exercise with others nation’s CT units. The opportunity of the dropping United States ban to Indonesia’s special forces (KOPASSUS) may eventually allow combat training of KOPASSUS .        This decision is meant to bolster the U.S. effort to build military ties with the world’s most populous Muslim nation, seen in Washington as an ally in the fight against Islamist extremism. Considering, Indonesia was hit by deadly bomb attacks on two luxury hotels in the capital Jakarta last year, blamed on a splinter group that had split from the Jemaah Islamiah militant group.

Indonesia still have a big potential to become a haven of terrorists as well as to become their target. The modus operandi and their target are changing from time to time. It is very important to have a strong and well coordinated body to do counter terrorism tasks. TNI with their experiences in eliminating separatism and terrorism in the past must be involved in combating terrorism in Indonesia, however, the use of power still need to be controlled  to avoid over reaction from TNI which may lead a bad opinion and the failure of CT mission in bigger picture.

BNPT is  an excellence committee to regulate and coordinate the function of TNI and Polri against terrorism. The mixed force inside BNPT must be built carefully by considering proportional representative from TNI and Polri to achieve the best performance.

V. Bibliography and Reference

[1] Thomas J. Badley. Defining International Terrorism: A Pragmatic Approach. Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 10, No. 1, Spring 1998, p.90.

[2] Tom Maley. What is Terrorism? Issues of Definition. Presentation Slide for Indonesia Defence University, 2010, p.4.

[3] The Law of Republic of Indonesia, number 15 year 2003 article c.

[4]TNI Manual Handbook for Counter Terrorism, Army Headquarter Office, February 2009

[5] Law number 20 in the year of 1982, the basic rules of defence and security in Indonesia. ( UU no 20/1982 tentang Ketentuan-ketentuan Pokok Pertahanan Keamanan Negara Republik Indonesia)

[6] http://muradi.wordpress.com/2009/05/12/densus-88-at-peran-dan-koordinasi-dalam-pemberantasan-terorisme-di-indonesia/, on July 25th, 2010 at 19.30 WIB

[7] ibid

[8] http://muradi.wordpress.com/2009/05/12/densus-88-at-peran-dan-koordinasi-dalam-pemberantasan-terorisme-di-indonesia/, on July 25th, 2010 at 19.30 WIB

[9] ibid

[10] ibid

[11] http://indonesiaeliteforces.tripod.com/id12.html on July 26th, 2010 at 19.00 WIB

[12] http://www.scribd.com/doc/9220542/pasukan-elite-dan-khusus-indonesia on July 26th, 2010 at 19.40 WIB

[13] http://indonesiaeliteforces.tripod.com/id9.html on July 26th, 2010 at 20.00 WIB

[14] Law number 20 in the year of 1982, the basic rules of defence and security in Indonesia. ( UU no 20/1982 tentang Ketentuan-ketentuan Pokok Pertahanan Keamanan Negara Republik Indonesia)

[15] http://www.scribd.com/doc/9220542/pasukan-elite-dan-khusus-indonesia on July 26th, 2010 at 20.00 WIB

[16] “ Densus 88 Polri “ accessed on http://www.sulut.polri.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=90&Itemid=81

[17] “Bom meledak di depan kedubes Australia” accessed on http://www.suarapembaruan.com/News/2004/09/09/Utama/ut01.htm

[18] “ Bani yamin minta jenazah Dr. Azhari disholatkan” accessed on http://www.kapanlagi.com/h/old/0000090967.html

[19] “Noordin M. Top diyakini tewas di Mojosono” accessed on http://www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/fokus/2009/09/17/fks,20090917-841,id.html

[20] “Densus 88 AT dan Pemberantasan Terorisme di Indonesia” accessed on http://densus88-antiteror.blogspot.com/p/densus-88-at-dan-pemberantasan.html

[21] Romli Atmasasmita, “Counter-Terrorism, Human Rights, and Rule of Law: Indonesian Perspective” accessed on http://www.legalitas.org/node/368

[22] Undang-Undang Nomor 34 tahun 2004 tentang TNI, accessed on http://www.pdat.co.id/hg/reference_pdat/2004/11/09/UU%20No%2034%20tentang%20Tentara%20Nasional%20Indonesia%20%28TNI%29.pdf

[23] Muladi, Problematika Hubungan TNI-Polri Dalam Menangani Terorrisme dan kejahatan lintas batas, in Al Araf, Anton Aliabbas, Tni-Polri di Masa Perubahan Politik, Program Magister Studi Pertahanan ITB, Bandung, hal. 96-97

[24] Arfi Bambani Amri, Mohammad Adam, “DPR: Perlu PP untuk pakai TNI lawan Teroris” accessed on http://nasional.vivanews.com/news/read/84884-dpr__perlu_pp_untuk_pakai_tni_lawan_teroris

[25] Kompas, “Perlu diatur, kerjasama TNI-Polri dalam menanggulangi terorisme” accessed on http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2008/12/21/15170876/perlu.diatur.kerjasama.tni-polri.menanggulangi.terorisme.

[26] TV One, “Polri Diimbau Kerjasama TNI dalam menanggulangi Terorrisme” accessed on http://nasional.tvone.co.id/berita/view/34019/2010/03/08/polri_diimbau_kerjasama_tni_berantas_terorisme/

[27] Rachland Nashidik dan Al Araf, Problem Keseimbangan antara  Keamanan dan Kebebasan dalam Penanggulangan Terorisme, in Al Araf, Anton Aliabbas, Tni-Polri di Masa Perubahan Politik, Program Magister Studi Pertahanan ITB, Bandung, hal. 156 [1]VivaNews,“Bagaimana Desk Anti-terorr Bekerja” accessed on http://nasional.vivanews.com/news/read/81852-bagaimana_desk_antiteror_tni_ad_bekerja

[28] Muladi, Problematika Hubungan TNI-Polri Dalam Menangani Terorrisme dan kejahatan lintas batas, op.cit, pp.108

[29] Kompas, “After Kopassus released on US embargo” accessed on http://english.kompas.com/read/2010/07/23/09255941/After.Kopassus.Released.from.US.Military.Embargo-3

[30] http://jawapos.com/halaman/index.php?act=detail&nid=122088

[31] http://www.detiknews.com/read/2009/07/17/161656/1167203/10/data-ledakan-bom-di-indonesia-2000-2009

[32] http://www.antaranews.com/berita/1273834749/teroris-aceh-akan-serang-upacara-17-agustus

diambil dari executive paper (syndicate 4) Defense Management Cohort 2  Unhan (29/7/2010).

Penulis hanya menyajikan data ini sebagai referensi tulisan selanjutnya, dan penulis tidak ikut dalam perumusan kajian di atas.

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